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Does Subordinated Debt Discipline Banks? Empirical Evidence of Market Discipline in
Europe
Daniel Schürk
Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität
Abstract
This thesis provides a differentiated answer to the question whether subordinated debt disciplines bank’s risk-taking behavior. I
investigate the conditions and applicability of market discipline through subordinated debt instruments by critically reviewing
the state of research. Relating to the regulatory context, I discuss proposals and various empirical studies and find that
subordinated debt is an adequate measure to discipline banks under certain conditions.
My own empirical analysis contributes to evidence provided by prior studies and updates them for the European case.
I conclude that subordinated debt investors perceive differences in risk between banks and across time and are sensitive to
credit ratings and accounting variables at generally higher spread levels compared to senior bonds. Results include that spread
is positively sensitive (increases with respect to one standard error) to equity to capital (225 BPS), provision for loan losses
(200 to 225 BPS), non-performing loans to equity (400 to 715 BPS) and interest coverage ratio (60 BPS). Spread is negatively
sensitive (decreases with respect to one standard error) to ROA (120 BPS) and loan loss reserves (360 to 620 BPS).
Keywords: debt market discipline; bond spreads; subordinated debt; bail-in; bail-out; BRRD; Basel II; Basel III; market
monitoring; market influence.
1. Introduction
During the Great Financial Crisis (“GFC”), tax-payer’s
money was repeatedly used to bail out banks considered ‘too
big to fail’ and as such seen as a relevant risk to the financial
and economic system (Barth and Wihlborg, 2016). It was
widely criticized that banks did not bear the costs of their
own risks anymore and that risks were not controlled prop-
erly (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). Underestimating the
fragility, interconnectedness and complexity of global banks
led regulators to weaken supervisory efforts and elevated
risk-taking behavior of banks in the years preceding the cri-
sis. In the aftermath of the crisis, however, regulation in the
banking sector and especially in Europe tightened signifi-
cantly to mitigate excessive risk-taking and to avoid further
costly bail-outs (Dewatripont, 2014). Exclusively relying on
direct regulation measures, such as capital and disclosure re-
quirements, might not be sufficient to cope with banks’ risks,
as noted in the Squam Lake Report (French et al., 2010).
Lately, regulation is increasingly putting emphasis on
the potential of self-controlling, market-based mechanisms,
termed ‘market discipline’ (“MD”). The rationale is that
by monitoring bank’s behavior and condition, market par-
ticipants are ultimately influencing risk-taking reciprocally
when managers take into account capital market’s evaluation
(Flannery, 2001). This concept could supplement traditional
supervisory measures (Hoang et al., 2014). Research on mar-
ket discipline of debt capital has expanded with increased
interest from supervising authorities. Following a surge in
publications in the years around the turn of the millennium,
one can notice that more research has been provided since
2009 paralleled by ongoing negotiations on Basel III. With
the new European framework on Bank Recovery and Res-
olution (“BRRD”), regulators are committed to strengthen
market discipline further (Lintner, 2017), by implementing
a bail-in tool.
Central to the concept of market discipline is the asset
class of subordinated debt (“SD”)1. These high-yield instru-
ments rank just after equity when it comes to absorbing losses
in capital restructuring (‘bail-in’) and are thus exposed to
higher risk of default. When reflected in the risk premium
on markets (as in spreads), this should provide incentive to
investors to monitor default risks (Chen and Hasan, 2011).
1More specifically, I will only refer to subordinated bonds in this thesis.
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In theory, this quality makes them an ideal tool for exerting
MD, serving as an indicator for investor’s sensitivity to risk,
when perceiving the bank’s risk (Bliss and Flannery, 2002).
Higher yields are demanded by investors and account for
riskier projects and assets of the bank. I want to test this
rationale empirically to answer the question whether SD is
an adequate instrument to discipline banks in Europe. I will
discuss conditions and implications constituting market dis-
cipline and the channels through which SD might discipline
banks. Further analyzing the monitoring and influencing
phases, I will highlight limitations to the implementation of
MD and present proposals which respond to these issues. In
the main body of my thesis, the empirical work, I will present
my own study on the relevance and sensitivity of SD in Eu-
rope. My analysis will contribute to the current discussion
since evidence from earlier studies could be outdated due to
regulatory adjustments and higher commitment to banking
resolution in Europe.
This thesis seeks to answer the following main research
questions:
1. What is the context and rationale of subordinated debt
when establishing market discipline in the banking sec-
tor?
2. Under which conditions can subordinated debt effec-
tively work as an adequate measure to monitor and in-
fluence a bank’s risk-taking behavior?
3. What are the features and conflicts to the implementa-
tion of subordinated debt presented in current propos-
als?
4. What are the characteristics of the current market for
subordinated debt in Europe?
5. Is there empirical evidence of sensitivity of subordi-
nated bond spreads towards the risk profile of a bank,
i.e. can investors monitor the bank?
Narrowing the objective of my study, the empirical part of the
thesis will clearly focus on the monitoring phase of SD, that
is the sensitivity of spreads to risk measures, and will not aim
at providing evidence for the influencing phase. Moreover, I
will not discuss the general comparison on the rationale of
bail-ins versus bail-outs, the role of deposit insurance, legal
details of SD or MD or models on moral hazard behavior in
banks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the
following section (section 2) introduces the regulatory con-
text and core concepts and briefly reviews the literature on
implications, drawbacks and conditions for effective market
discipline before presenting proposals, addressing research
questions 1 to 3. Section 3 discusses research questions 4
and 5 and provides a review of empirical evidence on spread
sensitivity of SD, methodological considerations and my own
empirical results for the European case. Section 4 concludes
the thesis with a summary, open research questions and an
outlook.
2. Analysis of effective market discipline by subordinated
debt
This section builds the foundation for understanding the
debate on SD as a disciplining instrument. A critical analy-
sis will be undertaken on recent and earlier research papers
to evaluate the viability of SD as a measure for disciplining
banks.
2.1. Regulatory context
The regulatory framework of banking supervision is orig-
inally designed to protect the economy from systemic risk.
However, when governments also act as a lender of last resort
and provide a deposit insurance system, this could entail in-
centives for banks to increase leverage and risk-taking respec-
tively (Flannery, 2001). According to his findings, govern-
ment guarantees and deposit insurance are mispriced, mean-
ing that banks and their owners do not bear their own risk.
Additionally, there could exist higher social cost from pub-
lic oversight compared to private governance systems in the
banking sector. These aspects, combined with the repeated
inability of supervisors to mitigate banking crises, as shown
in Lall (2012), call for alternative supervisory mechanisms.
After many financial crises (more specific: banking crises)
regulators are thus adjusting their framework, imposing
stricter regulation on capital adequacy and disclosure (Barth
et al., 2004). On a supranational level, banking regulation
was established by the Basel programs with the objective of
improving transparency and reliability of financial informa-
tion of banks. Most of these measures are focused on the
prevention of public bail-outs, prevalent in the GFC, which
can easily spark a chain reaction as a spillover effect on a
public debt crisis. Conversely, if regulation is designed too
tight in terms of capital requirements, this could contract the
vital function of banks creating liquidity (Van den Heuvel,
2008).
To overcome this dilemma of direct regulatory require-
ments, the third pillar of Basel II endeavors to implement
alternative regulatory measures, making use of market in-
struments as a self-controlling mechanism to let the market
discipline banks partially. Optimally, this releases govern-
ments from the inherent paradigm of giving guarantees to
bail out banks (Grossman and Woll, 2014) and returns the
accountability for losses back to markets, i.e. investors who
are bailed-in depending on the payment rank of their capi-
tal. The newly implemented Banking Union in the EU and
the recovery and resolution mechanism for banks (BRRD),
turned into effective law in the national states by 2016, sup-
ports the internalization of liability. Resolution mechanisms
in BRRD (Lintner, 2017) prescribe a clear ranking of bail-in
procedure with equity holders absorbing losses prior to un-
secured junior debt (so-called waterfall principle). Current
European regulation under the name Minimum Requirement
for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (“MREL”) specifies the
criteria for subordination and bail-in order following the in-
ternational rules for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (“TLAC”)
D. Schürk / Junior Management Science 4(2) (2019) 228-240230
introduced by the Financial Stability Board. Beyond the com-
mitment to a bail-in tool, the new regulation wants to evade
TBTF guarantees. In June 2017, for the first time since the es-
tablishment of BRRD, subordinated debt holders and share-
holders of struggling Banco Popular, the sixth-largest Spanish
bank, were bailed in and absorbed full losses without harm-
ing tax-payers (Buck, 2017). This might serve as a blueprint
to further resolutions, possibly in sight regarding the condi-
tion of troubled Italian banks (Martino, 2017).
While the bail-in order is not a self-purpose or a mech-
anism for quick resolution only, it is also intended to have
repercussions on the awareness of risk to mitigate the im-
pact of future banking crises (Dewatripont, 2014) eventually.
‘Bail-inable’ capital is thus elevating market discipline.
2.2. The case for market discipline
Market discipline can be defined in its broadest sense as
a mechanism by which bank’s risk-taking behavior is mon-
itored and influenced by market forces (Hamalainen et al.,
2009). Commentators are arguing to which extent MD might
supplement and replace regulators and if it does so at all
(Bliss et al., 2001). Whereas the notion of liability and funda-
mentals of MD are already common for non-financial corpo-
rations, implementation in a heavily regulated financial envi-
ronment seems to be more complex. In a speech delivered at
the New York University Law School in April 2007 (see quote
on next page), the then-chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke,
was already aware of the need for MD. It should be noted
that this speech was held just few months before the begin-
ning of the crisis – not knowing what was about to happen
in the succeeding months.
“The lesson of history appears to be that nei-
ther market discipline nor regulatory oversight
alone is completely adequate for keeping the
banking system safe and sound. However, regu-
lators have increasingly come to appreciate the
value of a hybrid system that supplements direct
regulation with a substantial amount of market
discipline. Fortunately, regulators have a variety
of ways to restore and strengthen market disci-
pline for banks, notwithstanding the existence of
the federal safety net.” (Bernanke, 2007)
However, the recent incorporation of MD in the banking sec-
tor (Bernanke’s hybrid system) is not a new phenomenon.
Private governance frameworks and incentive-based regula-
tory design emerged in the US (Bliss and Flannery, 2002) and
are generally proposed by opponents of too strict government
controls, since they give more weight to market-based mech-
anisms. Discussions were initially sparked in a similar con-
text to the present post-GFC period, when several US banks
defaulted during the savings and loan crisis in the 80s of the
last century as government guarantees led them to higher
risk-taking (Board of Governors of the Fed, 1999).
Besides concepts of MD focusing on equity and deposits,
the “Squam Lake Report“ repeatedly stressed the relevance
of debt market discipline (French et al., 2010). This form
of MD can be broken down into two phases: the monitoring
phase followed by the influencing phase. Bliss and Flannery
(2002), among other authors, differentiate between the abil-
ity to understand, interpret and price information on changes
to the banks’ decisions (monitoring) and the ability to ul-
timately impact the decision maker’s behavior via security
prices (influence).
For the influencing phase, the common literature distin-
guishes further between direct and indirect disciplinary ef-
fects (Hamalainen et al., 2009). Direct influence relates to
higher costs of borrowing for new issuances on primary mar-
kets through a higher risk premium. Investors are anticipat-
ing the risk of default banks and can thus influence bank man-
agers behavior ex-post. Indirect discipline refers to the reg-
ulator, who is interpreting and incorporating market signals
from secondary markets into its supervisory actions.
2.3. Why subordinated debt?
Until now, I only discussed MD in its theoretical rationale.
Both direct and indirect MD, however, require an adequate
instrument on markets, where expectations are traded and
priced. While MD might be also imposed by shareholders
or relevant depositors (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004),
debt markets are particularly suitable for implementing MD
due to higher risk sensitivity of debt holders and generally a
higher frequency of debt issuances (Chen and Hasan, 2011).
Constant payments on the face value encompass a downside
risk without the benefit of large upside gains, common for
equity holders.
SD is typically unsecured capital and uninsured by any
governmental safety net. It can also come with convertible
features; however, I will regard CoCos only as a sub-category
to SD. Basel III regulation accounts SD to Additional Tier 1
if it is subordinated to the general debt and if it has no ma-
turity (perpetual bonds) and to Tier 2 capital if maturity is
longer than 5 years2. It thereby ranks lower in the liquida-
tion scheme than normal debt in case of default and acts as
an additional capital buffer similar to equity capital, supple-
menting Tier 1 capital and increasing the robustness of de-
posit insurance besides strengthening the position of senior
debt holders (Caldwell et al., 2005). What makes SD par-
ticularly interesting to banks is its simple and quick issuance
compared to stocks. Investors, on the other hand, are at-
tracted by higher yields.
Being exposed to a higher risk profile, reflected in the risk
premium on markets (as in spreads), should provide more
incentive to investors to monitor default risks (Chen and
Hasan, 2011). In turn, this price sensitivity of SD possibly
carries valuable information about default risks and might
better reflect the financial situation of a bank compared to
senior debt. SD is thus a better instrument for MD compared
to depositors, who can silently withdraw their funds and do
not provide an immediate market signal (Calomiris, 1999).
2See BCBS publication 189 for Basel III rules on capital treatment, avail-
able at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
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2.4. Conditions for effective market discipline
Reflecting Bernanke’s speech quoted above from today’s
standpoint, the obvious question is why MD failed during the
crisis. Since bond spreads seemed to react only when it was
too late, we would have to ask which conditions were not met
at that time prior to the crisis. In this section, I will discuss
conditions and limitations to MD. For further analysis, I will
refer to the comprehensive framework graphed in Figure 1,
which is an adapted representation from Hamalainen et al.
(2009).
2.4.1. Market monitoring
The market monitoring phase (or recognition phase in
Hamalainen et al., 2009) can be seen as the necessary pre-
phase for the succeeding phase of market influence (see
section 2.4.2). Market participants should be able to un-
derstand changes in a bank’s condition (sub-phase 1 in the
above framework), consider themselves at risk (sub-phase 2)
and price this perception accordingly (sub-phase 3). Several
studies show that bond prices are indeed related to the con-
dition of banks or bank holding companies, especially prior
to bank failure (Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2001)3. There are,
however, several conditions which must be fulfilled to allow
investors to perceive and price risk accordingly.
First, to satisfy condition C1, the ‘informed investor’ hy-
pothesis must hold (Hancock and Birchler, 2004). Informa-
tion gathering must not be linked to high costs and there must
be constant information provision towards investors. This re-
quires a regulatory framework with high transparency. The
strengthened reporting and disclosure rules together with
credit ratings should set the baseline for informed markets.
Nevertheless, the reliability of the signal of subordinated
bond yields might be limited due to infrequent issuing be-
havior (Evanoff et al., 2011). Admati and Hellwig (2013)
even call debt market discipline a myth due to high informa-
tional costs incurred by the creditors. Investors could well
be ‘free-riding’ on information provided by other investors
which, in effect, lowers the incentive for monitoring. More-
over, the efficacy of monitoring also depends on the type of
investor and their ability to detect risks. While institutional
investors or peer banks might actively monitor banks and
financial status, private investors incur much higher infor-
mation costs for monitoring internal risks. For example, in
the Italian SD market, half of the amount issued is allocated
to individual investors (see Martino, 2017). This undermines
the ‘informed investor’ assumption further.
Regarding the second condition (C2), the ‘too-big-to-fail’
argument presented in Mishkin et al. (2006) undermines the
relevance of MD since investors anticipate being bailed out by
the safety-net of the government. For effective MD, however,
explicit and implicit guarantees for public bail-out must be
irrelevant to investors so that they bear the full risk of losses
on their investments and thus internalize the bank’s risk. In
3Refer to section 3.1 for an overview over other prior studies.
the current European context, this condition is increasingly
enforced through the BRRD framework.
To further ensure efficiency (condition 3), markets must
be sufficiently deep in terms of liquidity. Although this might
be fulfilled for large banks and issuances, Chen and Hasan
(2011) note that SD might not be the right instrument of
choice for monitoring small banks, since low liquidity on
these markets (especially on secondary markets) comes with
increased noise and volatility. The lower trading volume on
secondary markets leads to a liquidity premium one would
have to adjust for (Evanoff et al., 2011).
Another pitfall to monitoring goes beyond the three con-
ditions. The so-called ‘double endogeneity problem’ pre-
sented in Birchler and Facchinetti (2007) questions the abil-
ity of markets to price risk when participants assume that
banks are disciplined by their own monitoring efforts. They
anticipate their own disciplining effect into their pricing pro-
cess and do not exert discipline consequently.
2.4.2. Market influence
The ability to monitor risk solely is not sufficient for holis-
tic MD. The signal provided must also be put into actionable
controls, either by creditors (direct MD) or by the supervisor
(indirect MD).
Direct market discipline (“DMD”) is exerted directly by
markets when demanding a higher risk premium. Hwang
and Min (2013) distinguish DMD further between weak and
strong MD. The former is referring to higher financing costs
incurred when investors are pricing the risk accordingly; the
latter is reflecting the inability to raise further capital if the
probability of default surpasses a critical line. Strong MD will
probably only be observed in times of approaching distress.
Besides to the pure financing view, one might also expect
an ex-ante effect of influence imposed by covenants as an-
other channel of MD, as shown by Goyal (2005). Since the
strength of covenants of different instruments is negatively
related to the risk premium, there can surely be observed
different spreads across instruments.
The Board of Governors of the Fed (1999) emphasizes
that the share of SD must be relevant and sizeable (Condition
4.2) to impact total funding costs and influence managerial
behavior. Bliss and Flannery (2002) provide research regard-
ing this question on cost effects of spreads. They generally
find that market prices alone are not strong enough to influ-
ence key decisions like the choice of leverage, dividends and
the level of liabilities, probably due to the small market size
of SD (breaching C4.2 in the framework).
There remains another pitfall to the use of SD regarding
incentive structures (condition 5) which can be easily under-
stood when considering SD as a capital source with similar
characteristics as equity, particularly vulnerable to moral haz-
ard problems. In the case of default, or rather close to that
state, SD investors would as well support risky investments
and be supportive for so-called ‘gambling for resurrection’ de-
cisions (Bliss et al., 2001). In this case, the impact on spreads
would be distorted.
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Figure 1: The phases of effective market discipline, adapted from Hamalainen et al. (2009)
SD spread signals attained from monitoring could also in-
directly influence banks when anticipating regulatory action,
which should be timely and credible (see condition C4.1). In
contrast to DMD, indirect market discipline can only be ex-
ercised through publicly placed instruments as the pricing by
markets must send an observable signal to the regulator. Al-
though this market signal means a partial delegation of mon-
itoring activities from the supervisor to markets, the super-
visor will still step in to perform prompt corrective action or
on-site examinations if distress is expected.
Current early-warning models and triggers for regulatory
action primarily focus on book variables and the so-called
CAMELS4 rating to evaluate distress. Conversely, SD spreads
could also be an adequate measure to incorporate market-
based information on distress (Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2001).
They could even be better predictors than traditional Tier 1
capital ratios (Evanoff and Wall, 2000). However, the noise
of SD spreads (vide supra) makes them hard to interpret as
a stable indicator, additional factors might naturally distort
market data (see Chen and Hasan (2011) and Bliss et al.
(2001)). One can also categorically question whether yields
really comprise additional information to supervisors. Bliss
et al. (2001) points out that investors only observe publicly
available information also available to supervisors. He ques-
tions the signaling effect of bond spreads and advises to use
combined measures, such as incorporating equity prices into
risk assessment. Nevertheless, even an imprecise signal could
complement supervisor’s assessment and actions and could
help them to react promptly to banks in distress (Flannery,
2001).
Summing up the previous sections, I refer to the con-
clusion of Flannery (2001), who supposes that SD spreads
might inform about different risk levels (monitoring phase)
4Rating system to classify a bank’s overall condition, evaluating (C)apital
adequacy, (A)ssets, (M)anagement Capability, (E)arnings, (L)iquidity and
(S)ensitivity.
but do not necessarily discipline banks accordingly (influenc-
ing phase). In his view, supervisors are better at influencing
firms and investors have a comparative advantage in moni-
toring banks via markets. To minimize the probability of fail-
ure in supervision, he calls for a combination of both chan-
nels.
2.5. Mandatory subordinated debt proposals
Due to high financing costs, banks are inherently reluc-
tant to issue more SD voluntarily. Frequency of issuance and
amount issued might rest at low levels in the future. Besides
using market information from SD spreads only as evalua-
tive information, authorities could turn to mandatory regu-
lation to strengthen the role of MD, as desired in the speech
by Bernanke quoted above. To enforce mandatory proposals,
the regulator could require predefined levels of SD, for ex-
ample calculated as a share of total debt, and act if banks are
reluctant to issue sufficient SD (Chen and Hasan, 2011).
In the following, I will summarize only the most relevant
proposals of mandatory programs and link them to the frame-
work in Figure 1. For an extensive review of mandatory SD
proposals, one can refer to a ‘Staff Study’ by Fed Board mem-
bers (Board of Governors of the Fed, 1999). For an overview
of proposals on features like maturity, size and further SD
features, refer to Hamalainen (2004).
Early proposals emerged in the US with the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act from 1999, which led the Fed to examine
a mandatory program. However, the Board did not see ex-
tended need to take prompt action. They called for further
research on smaller banks’ barriers to issue and delayed a
decision due to increasing numbers of voluntary issuances
(Board of Governors of the Fed, 1999).
Calomiris (1999), as an outstanding advocate for the
mandatory solution, puts forward a radical proposal. While
a cap on spreads at issuance would serve to account for ex-
cessive risk-taking behavior, he also proposes a minimum fre-
quency of issuance to provide markets with a constant stream
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of information (addressing condition C1). This would, how-
ever, require maturities to decrease far below current levels.
If banks do not comply with the frequency of issuance or if
bonds hit the spread cap, he proposes an obligation to shrink
the asset side monthly to meet requirements.
Caldwell et al. (2005) picks up the debate on desired min-
imum maturity of SD instruments. He states that short-term
SD does not anticipate long-term risks and would addition-
ally come with higher costs of issuance given the higher fre-
quency. The positive effects of liquidity come at a price. Both
banks and supervisors might be willing to tend to longer ma-
turities, seeking for permanence and stability. Long maturi-
ties, however, increase the risk to debt holders, tying them
to the bank. The maturity requirements are therefore a pure
trade-off between liquidity and information provision (mon-
itoring phase) and the strength of the disciplining effect (in-
fluencing phase).
Caldwell et al. (2005) also points out that mandatory
programs could prevent small banks from timing their is-
suance decision. By studying the SD market for large and
small Canadian banks, he assesses an incentive for small
banks to systematically place SD in ‘quiet times’ while avoid-
ing issuance when spreads are higher. They might also is-
sue SD before negative news on their risk-taking behavior
reach the market and thus actively evade MD. In contrast
to big banks, small banks seem to be more inclined to time
their issuing behavior due to higher cost of funding. He
suggests a framework which accounts for this characteristic.
Hamalainen et al. (2010) review the case for mandatory SD
policy for companies in the UK. Conversely to the findings
of Caldwell et al. (2005), their findings suggest, that in the
highly concentrated banking sector in the UK, only the six
largest banks should be obliged to issue SD.
Chen and Hasan (2011) point out a side-concern which
has not been discussed so far. They describe the possible sce-
nario of investors ‘colluding’ with the bank (violating con-
dition C3), in which the bank indirectly ‘pays’ investors in
terms of higher coupons for not being monitored by them.
This limitation to the efficiency of markets would require in-
terest ceilings similar to those proposed by Calomiris (1999).
In a recent paper, Evanoff et al. (2011) discuss questions
on the frequency and amount issued, again. They ask under
which conditions SD spreads would be more inclined to be
sensitive to bank risk and test their hypothesis that market
depth is crucial here. Deeper markets, measured in terms
of liquidity and size, could positively moderate the sensitiv-
ity since more information is provided around the issuance
of debt instruments (condition C1). Risky banks could not
avoid market exposure and market discipline anymore and
low-risk banks could be incentivized to be transparent and
benefit from lower funding costs (Evanoff et al., 2011).
Following the positive assessment of the effectiveness of
SD in Evanoff et al. (2011), regulators should consider incor-
porating convertible features to SD into their reforms. Con-
tingent convertible SD could increase the incentive for mon-
itoring and lever risk sensitivity since investors would fear
losses from conversion (Posner, 2010). These so-called CoCo
bonds received broad attention by researchers and regulators
(Avdjiev et al., 2013) and have developed a relevant market
since their set-up in 2009, when regulators forced banks to
issue this specific type of SD. Basically, CoCo bonds are hy-
brid debt instruments which are converted into equity when
a predefined trigger is breached. Their qualities as (subordi-
nated) mezzanine debt make them first choice in overcom-
ing classic issues of debt-equity agency problems. Further
papers discuss the design of such contingent convertible re-
quirements (Herring and Calomiris, 2011). In a more recent
paper, Hilscher and Raviv (2014) present their research on
how CoCo bonds influence risk-taking behavior and default
probabilities of banks and find that optimally constructed
CoCo bonds strongly impact these factors. They point out
that contract terms (e.g. conversion ratio and thresholds)
significantly matter here.
The discussed proposals could be adopted along current
regulation on bail-in capital in Europe but require further re-
search on their implementation. Future role of market dis-
cipline by SD will be determined by viable approaches and
subject to regulators’ decisions.
3. Empirical evidence on the monitoring phase
In the previous section 2, I laid out various conditions
for verifying the existence and effectiveness of MD through
SD and presented main proposals for implementation preva-
lent in the literature. The following part will revise empirical
findings from prior studies and offer an own empirical ap-
proach to the assessment of risk sensitivity of SD. I will test
for the monitoring phase of MD, more specifically for condi-
tion 3 in the framework in Figure 1 (vide supra). A positive
assessment of the awareness of bank’s risk by investors would
partially prove MD.
3.1. Prior empirical studies
First studies, published in the 1980s as a reaction to
higher perceived risk in the US banking sector, show am-
biguous results for the significance of efficient monitoring.
For a sample period prior to 1991, Avery et al. (1988) do
not find significant relationship between SD spreads and
bank’s risk-taking behavior. Later studies reviewing their
findings explain the lack of explanatory power with implicit
government guarantees in place (violating condition C2),
possibly distorting market prices. Bail-outs of banks like
Continental Illinois were then common practice by the Fed.
Another study by Gorton and Santomero (1990) extends the
previous model, adjusting it for leverage ratios which were
not considered earlier. The rationale behind this adjustment
comes from the insight that SD rather behaves like equity
and higher risk could lead to higher returns. The findings of
Avery et al. (1988) are confirmed, refusing the hypothesis
that SD spreads and investors incorporate risk measures.
The second generation of studies, emerging in the 1990s,
uses more recent data and comes to a positive assessment
on the existence of SD sensitivity to risk measures. For this
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period, there was a structural change in the banking land-
scape due to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act (“FDICIA”) in 1991, when the US government
ended their bail-out policy of banks considered TBTF. Flan-
nery and Sorescu (1996) provide this opposing evidence for
the 1983-1991 period, finding a significant correlation of risk
measures (especially on credit ratings) for bank holding com-
panies for later years, when banks were not considered TBTF
anymore.
Most studies, until the turn of the millennium, focused
on US markets and banks. Sironi (2003) presents a first
study on European banks, methodologically similar to pre-
vious studies on US banks, with a sample period from 1991
to 2000, also confirming a sensitive relationship. His find-
ings give evidence that (1) investors are sensitive to bank
risk, using stand-alone credit ratings which exclude the im-
pact of implicit guarantees, (2) sensitivity has increased with
disappearing guarantees from governments and (3) public
banks (especially referring to Germany) show no spread-
relationship of risk measures since they enjoy explicit govern-
ment guarantees. de Mendonça and Loures (2009) present
a first study for an emerging country, Brazil, but only find
weak evidence of MD. These studies aside, the number of
recent studies using panel regressions, like I do, is limited
and therefore updates are overdue.
There remain important caveats to cross-sectional studies
investigating yield-risk relations (Bliss et al., 2001). Besides
giving ambiguous evidence, most of the studies do not an-
alyze the relevance of timeliness. Moreover, while most of
the studies use accounting variables or credit ratings to ex-
plain different spread levels and movements, only few like
Park and Peristiani (1998) make use of variables on market
condition.
3.2. The market for subordinated debt in Europe
Using available data from Bloomberg data services, I will
briefly describe the primary market for SD in Europe, based
on own calculations. The total sample consists of 3712 bond
issuances during the period from 1982 to 2017, whereas I
will focus on the post-crisis period from 2007 to 2016 in the
analysis.
Subordinated bonds are predominately denominated in
EUR (65% of all issuances), followed by denominations in
USD (17%), GBP (8%) and other currencies (10%). Euro-
pean banks have issued a total of EUR 326bn, USD 204bn
and GBP 45bn over the analyzed period. The largest Euro
issuers (share of all issuances: Italy 24%, Spain – 21%, the
Netherlands – 9%, France – 8% and Great Britain – 7%) are
accounting for EUR 224bn or 69% of the total amount issued
in Euro.
Analyzing the amount issued over time, I observe an in-
creasing amount of Euro issuances from EUR 23.8bn in 2000
peaking at EUR 52.5bn issued in 2007, but decreasing again
to EUR 19.9bn in 2016. The same pattern is observed for
USD issuances (USD 6.3bn in 2000, USD 24.1bn in 2009 and
USD 21.8bn in 2016). Total market size of SD seems to be at
moderate to low levels at this point of time.
With an average of 10 years to maturity, 42% of all is-
suances are maturing at 10 years from issuance and 20% are
perpetual bonds. Half of all bonds are callable, containing
a premium for the call option, while only 43% come with
no further specification on maturity type. Average spread-
to-benchmark of the debt notes at issuance in my sample is
336 BPS (with a standard error of 186 BPS) and coupons are
oftentimes paid on a floating basis. Average credit ratings
of these high-yield instruments are ranging from BBB (Stan-
dard&Poor’s and Fitch) to Baa3 (Moody’s).
Secondary markets for SD, however, are still considered
relatively illiquid in Europe, as I infer from the fact that sub-
ordinated bond prices are only rarely quoted by brokers.
3.3. Hypotheses
I will narrow the focus of my empirical work to testing
the necessary condition for MD, the monitoring phase, and
want to assess the risk perception and sensitivity of SD in-
vestors. This is to determine which accounting variables are
significantly contributing to the spread of SD bonds. Finding
significant evidence for risk-indicating variables explaining
spreads would substantiate market monitoring by investors
as discussed in section 2.4.1. The view that market efficiency
is per se given should not be considered as self-evident in
the banking sector according to Flannery (2001), especially
when governments make use of guarantees, as discussed in
section 2. The hypotheses reflecting my approach are formu-
lated in the following way:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Spreads of subordinated
bonds are significantly higher than spreads of
senior bonds.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): External credit ratings have
significant influence on SD spreads, investors
perceive the risk of default assessed by external
rating agencies.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Key accounting ratios have
significant influence on SD spreads. Investors
perceive and price key risk derived from lever-
age, profitability, asset quality and liquidity.
Whereas H1 and H2 can be tested with decent effort, H3 re-
quires more intense dedication to data collection and mod-
elling and constitutes my main work. It should be noted that
H1 is rather an auxiliary test, necessary because my further
regressions only test subordinated bond spreads solely and
not relative to senior debt. A comparison of both groups
of debt would be feasible but harder to implement, given a
lack of data and time constraints. If I accept H1, as I expect
per definition, it can be inferred that subordinated bonds are
high-yield bonds. This potentially makes them more sensi-
tive to risk and SD is thus an adequate instrument for MD.
H2 and H3 will then be testing spread sensitivity of subordi-
nated bonds towards either ratings or accounting measures.
Furthermore, it is important to note that my analysis will
not be able to render a differentiated answer to the question
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how higher spreads influence a bank’s reaction on asset com-
position and risk management decisions. To test for this type
of market influence, one can inverse the spread relation and
regress asset composition on spreads (Nguyen, 2013).
3.4. Methodology and data
Regarding H1, Welch’s t-test is applied to test the null-
hypothesis that the group of senior bonds and subordinated
bonds have equal means. Welch’s t-test is used instead of
Student’s t-test due to the different sample sizes across each
rating group and unequal variances across samples. Filtered
for available spread data, my analyzed sample includes 680
subordinated and senior bonds issued from 2007 to 2017.
Data is retrieved from Thomson One/SDC Platinum by fil-
tering the payment rank for subordinated bonds (excluding
flags containing ‘senior’, such as ‘subordinated senior bonds’)
and senior bonds (excluding flags containing ‘subordinated’,
respectively). Cardinalized Moody’s ratings (see Table X in
the appendix) are normalized to a scale from 1 to 10 and
thereby clustered in groups to facilitate interpretation. To
be able to compare groups of homogeneous bonds, I test for
the difference in each rating class. Only classes 1 to 6 are
comparable here, lower rating classes are only populated by
subordinated bonds or do not present sufficient observations.
To examine the influence of ratings (H2), I will run a sim-
ple OLS regression from equation (1), my dependent vari-
ables being Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s rating.
SPREADj = f (S&P Rankings j ∨Moody’s Ratings j) (1)
A panel regression with ratings would require time-series
data instead of static ratings only available. Furthermore,
ratings are only adjusted annually (if ever) and changes seem
to be too small to be relevant, which makes them a less suit-
able variable for a panel regression. Filtered for availability
of spread data and of ratings, the sample analyzed includes
360 subordinated bonds issued from 2007 to 2017. Rat-
ings, also retrieved from Thomson One/SDC Platinum and
Bloomberg, are cardinalized (see Table X in the appendix)
and normalized to a scale from 1 to 10 to facilitate compari-
son between rating agencies.
Regarding H3, testing the sensitivity of SD spreads to-
wards risk factors, a wide variety of studies (see section 3.1)
relies on cross-sectional time series models (panel regres-
sions). Studies using this model are evaluating how risk
measures of a bank, regarding the quality of the loan port-
folio and other accounting data (e.g. capital ratios, leverage,
profitability, etc.), can explain the risk premium to assess to
which extent SD investors are risk-sensitive to available in-
formation. My methodology follows the well-accepted and
widespread approach presented in Sironi (2003). I will give
an updated review of his evidence from 2003 for European
banks and use a wider set of variables to explain the spread.
The model is specified as follows with each observation i
for a specific bank and year:
SPREADj = f (RISK j) + ε j (2)
RISK is a measure of (default) risk which should be per-
ceived by investors depending on (book) accounting values.
RISK j = f (Leverage j , Profitability j , Asset Quality j , Liquidity j)
(3)
For the dependent variable (SPREAD), three different
specifications apply:
SPREAD (prim): These are primary market spreads (to
benchmark), extracted as transaction information from all
available deals from Bloomberg and Thomson One/SDC Plat-
inum. Static spreads at issuance are aggregated for each year
and bank to allow for a cross-sectional analysis. As actual
transaction prices (instead of quotes by brokers on secondary
markets), they provide a genuine view of the bank’s cost and
are better observable than secondary market spreads.
SPREAD (sec): I collected daily secondary market spreads
of about 700 traded instruments (the other 1000 bonds not
quoting prices) from Bloomberg and aggregated them on an
annual basis for each bank.5 Erroneous observations due to
wrong quotation (e.g. extremely large spreads) and negative
spreads are cleaned from the dataset.
∆SPREAD (sec): Calculated from SPREAD (sec) as the
approximated relative annual change for year t, which should
provide results independent of the spread level.
∆SPREAD(sec) = ln(
SPREAD(t)
SPREAD(t − 1) ) ∗ 100 (4)
For the independent variables, serving as risk measures
(RISK), I started testing the specification from Sironi (2003)
but added own variables to test a wider variety of specifica-
tions. The presented specifications on the choice of indepen-
dent variables result from iterative approaches maximizing
the significance level for each variable. The bank-specific ac-
counting data stem from Thomson Reuters DataStream. In-
dependent variables are standardized to their standard error.
Being aware of the conditions and caveats of such standard-
ization, I will apply it for better interpretation of the magni-
tude.6 The sample is sufficiently large and my explanatory
variables are approximately normally distributed. A descrip-
tion of all variables is presented in Table IV in the appendix,
together with Table V explaining the expected sign of the ex-
planatory variables chosen. For a sample summary and cor-
relation matrix, see Table VI and VII in the appendix. From
the latter, I conclude that correlation within the sample is rea-
sonable and does not distort my regression to great extent.
5The first attempt to gather traded spreads focused on meticulous own
work compiling a list of representative and comparable individual subordi-
nated bonds in terms of amount issued, currency and maturity date. How-
ever, I found that this sample is not representative and only found weak
significance in later regressions.
6Standardization generally requires sufficient sample size, normal distri-
bution of variables and ignores different standard errors between clusters
(here: banks).
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The Hausman test suggests fixed effects as the most effi-
cient model for my panel regression. A test indicating het-
eroscedasticity for my data leads me to use robust standard
errors in the model. Furthermore, after running an adequate
statistical test, time-fixed effects are implemented as an al-
ternative specification, which render more significant results
and notably higher explanatory power. F-tests are used to
determine if the coefficients are jointly different from zero.
My panel covers the period from 2007 to 2016 for a sam-
ple of 30 large EU banks and 2 large Swiss banks. Size is
being measured in terms of total assets; the sample further
includes the largest issuers of SD not present in the list of
largest banks. See Table IX in the appendix for the list of
sample banks.
The impact of sample selection bias for the sample period
and entities should be limited due to various reasons: First,
a surge in issuances already began around the years around
2005/2006 due to new Basel II regulation emphasizing MD.
Second, big mergers across my sample banks were not fre-
quent. Third, the presence of survivorship bias should be lim-
ited. The constituent’s list of the largest European banks did
not vary significantly, except for German public banks (var-
ious ‘Landesbanken’ and DZ Bank), vanishing from the list.
Since those banks enjoy explicit guarantees, their exclusion
does not harm my results for the sample of private banks.
3.5. Results and implications
Regarding H1, I find that subordinated debt (in contrast
to senior debt) exhibits a significantly higher spread level,
ranging from 50 to 120 basis points (“BPS”) and a higher
variation of spread level by looking at the standard errors.
See Table 1 on the next page for the overall results of Welch’s
t-test. SD can thus be an adequate measure for exercising
MD since investors are exposed to generally higher risk (mea-
sured by spreads).
From Table 1, one might observe that spread levels are
generally rising along higher rating classes, however, I did
not test for significance of this relationship so far. The test
for H2 in Table 2 on the next page delivers results to this
question. I can accept the hypothesis that credit ratings have
significant impact on primary market spreads. Spreads for
bonds with a lower/worse credit rating class increase signif-
icantly for each rating class.7 For S&P ratings, starting from
the non-significant intercept close to 0 BPS, spreads signifi-
cantly increase by approximately 80 BPS per rating class. For
Moody’s ratings, starting from the significant intercept at 46
BPS, spreads significantly increase by approximately 60 BPS
per rating class. I conclude that rating agencies play a vital
role in providing information to SD holders in primary mar-
kets. There exists a clear and sensitive relationship between
rating classes and spread level.
Interpreting the panel regression linked to H3, I find that
market participants are well-aware of different risk profiles
7Cardinalized and normalized on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the
worst rating class.
across banks over time and price this observed risk on pri-
mary and secondary markets for SD bonds. Results presented
in Table 3 (and Table VIII in the appendix for a model with-
out time-fixed effects) can be read in the following way: A
change of the explanatory variable by one standard deviation
(due to standardization) leads to an increase or decrease in
spread levels measured in BPS (SPREAD) or to an increase
or decrease in the relative change of spread measured in per-
centage points (∆SPREAD).
Summarizing the most relevant results of the time-fixed
effects regression in Table 3, based on significance levels of
1% or 5% and on high magnitude, I find the following: Spec-
ification (1) in Table 3 reports the spread level over time,
peaking in 2012. For specifications (2) to (4), with a change
of standard error by one unit, return on assets decreases
spreads by 120 BPS. Equity to capital increases spreads by
225 BPS, loan loss reserves decrease spread by 360 to 620
BPS and provision for loan losses increases spreads by 130 to
225 BPS. Loan losses to loan loss reserves decrease spreads
by 110 to 200 BPS. Non-performing loans to equity increase
spreads by 400 to 715 BPS. Total loans to total capital unex-
pectedly reduce spreads by 160 to 175 BPS. Interest cover-
age ratio increases spreads by 60 BPS. The change in spreads
(∆SPREAD) from specification (5) decreases unexpectedly
with non-performing loans to total loans by 15 percentage
points (“PPS”).
Without time-fixed effects, I observe loss in explanatory
power, reflected in lower levels of the coefficient of determi-
nation (R2). These results are therefore only reported in in
the appendix in Table VIII. I then find that (with a change
in standard error by one unit) return on assets decreases
spreads by 90 to 200 BPS, leverage decreases spreads by 225
to 290 BPS, equity to capital decreases spreads by 160 BPS
and loan loss coverage increases spreads by 40 to 45 BPS, just
as provision for loan losses increases spreads by 155 BPS.
Non-performing loans to loan loss reserves increase spread
by 150 to 170 BPS. Cash and securities to current debt por-
tion decrease spread by 90 to 170 BPS. ∆SPREAD rises for
a change in standard error by one unit with return on assets
by 23 PPS, with equity to capital by 14 PPS, with provision
for loan losses by 28 PPS, with non-performing assets to to-
tal assets by 150 PPS. It falls with loan loss reserves by 85
PPS, with non-performing loans to total loans by 36 PPS (un-
expectedly) and with total loans to total assets by 105 PPS
(also unexpectedly). ∆SPREAD also rises with the ratio of
cash and securities to total deposits by 65 PPS. The inverse
and overly high magnitude of non-performing loans to total
loans and to equity should be omitted due to high correla-
tion of 0.85 One should notice, however, that the explanatory
power measured by R2 is very low for the specification of the
model with ∆SPREAD.
Based on this regression, I can say that many account-
ing variables are found to be with significant influence and
magnitude to the spread level or the relative change in
spread level. Some interaction variables from previous stud-
ies (Sironi, 2003) linked to leverage, ROALEV and LLRLEV,
do not matter as risk variables to spreads in my regressions.
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Table 1: Welch’s t-test for difference between subordinated and senior bond spreads
Table 1 reports the results of Welch’s t-test, testing for a significant difference in means of spread levels between subordinated and senior bonds. Dependent
variable SPREAD (prim) are spreads to benchmark at issuance. The bonds are clustered in six rating classes obtained from the cardinalized Moody’s ratings
of the issued instrument. Moody’s ratings are chosen because the border to non-investment grade lies just between rating class 5 and 6 which does not distort
the means; Standard errors in parentheses; Significance level for difference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SPREAD (prim)
Rating Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Bond Group
Senior 41.46 130.5 95.93 193.1 249.4 417.0
-7.578 -8.437 -4.409 (25.75) (18.78) (37.61)
Subordinated 162.4 180.6 211.5 239.0 311.1 407.6
(22.50) (12.94) (16.57) (17.12) (16.01) (24.02)
Combined 50.47 155.0 142.6 225.7 291.3 409.4
-7.901 -7.850 -8.446 (14.36) (12.71) (20.60)
Difference 120.9*** 50.13*** 115.6*** 45.92* 61.76*** 9.355
(23.75) (15.45) (17.15) (30.92) (24.68) (44.63)
N (Senior) 87 101 96 25 33 7
N (Subord.) 7 97 65 61 70 31
N (total) 94 198 161 86 103 38
Table 2: Standard OLS regression of spread on credit ratings
In Table 2, I test for the relationship between credit ratings and the spread to benchmark at issuance for subordinated bonds, SPREAD (prim), in two different
OLS regressions for each rating agency. Ratings are cardinalized (see Table X in the appendix) and normalized on a scale from 1 to 10 to allow comparison
between the two different rating agencies; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
Variables SPREAD (prim)
Standard&Poor’s Moody‘s
(1) (2)
Rating 83.93*** 58.78***
(6.824) (4.271)
Constant 0.309 45.91**
(22.26) (17.74)
N 360 355
R2 0.297 0.349
This insignificant relationship might be explained by the fact
that I use book values instead of market values for equity
and debt. Some results are unexpected, conflicting with the
expectations from Table V in the appendix and should receive
more attention in future research.
Implications from my results are that investors can dis-
criminate between different risk levels in banks and are es-
pecially sensitive to return on assets, leverage, asset quality
(non-performing loans to equity), provision for loan losses
and loan loss reserves. Despite high significance of my find-
ings, the standard errors are relevant in size, meaning that
the effects can differ between banks. Furthermore, primary
market spreads seem to be with higher significance compared
to secondary market spreads, other specifications of SPREAD
(sec) are not reported due to low significance.
Beyond the scope and beyond natural constraints my the-
sis is subject to, it would be feasible and interesting to ana-
lyze some aspects in more detail. My methodology could be
extended to cover a larger sample and a longer time hori-
zon. Furthermore, one could use market values for some
variables such as leverage, adjust time intervals (quarterly
data, if available) and lag these explanatory variables to in-
vestigate timeliness of the relation. Considering the specifi-
cation of my model, further extensions could include aggre-
gated ratings as a time-series and any other variables that
could serve as risk indicators. To attain an optimal model,
one should systematically choose variables, for example by
applying Davidson-Mackinnon P-test. Furthermore, I would
advise testing the difference between small and big banks
(based on total assets) to uncover implicit guarantees.
4. Conclusion
In this thesis, I reviewed the concept of market discipline
exemplified by subordinated debt in the context of European
regulation after the financial crisis.
By analyzing the channels of market discipline, I high-
lighted the relevant conditions for effective market monitor-
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Table 3: Linear, time-fixed effects panel regressions of spreads on accounting variables
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results of my panel over the sample period from 2007 to 2016. Dependent variable is the mean of primary and secondary
market SPREAD (measured in BPS) and change in SPREAD (∆SPREAD, measured in percentage points) for each SD-issuing bank for each calendar year.
Explanatory variables are reported in Table IV and summarized statistically in Table VI. Independent variables are standardized to their standard error. Esti-
mation method is “fixed effects” augmented with time-fixed effects. Standard errors are set to be robust. Observations with high magnitude and significance
at 5% level are highlighted in bold. F-test statistic for common significance of coefficients is not reported, however, the test is significant for every specification
at the 1% level.; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
Variables SPREAD (sec) SPREAD (prim) ∆SPREAD (sec)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ROA -116.4** -124.5** -118.6** 9.640
(41.29) (47.77) (47.00) (7.058)
LEV -84.60*
(41.16)
EQ 231.9*** 223.8*** 9.669*
(39.58) (48.78) (4.901)
LLR -365.9*** -358.3*** -617.3***
(124.5) (105.3) (184.7)
PROVLL 132.6** 201.2*** 225.3*** 18.64*
(58.41) (64.32) (57.27) (9.620)
LLtoLLR -118.9*** -112.2*** -203.4*** -7.671*
(25.67) (19.93) (63.39) (3.986)
NETLL 89.57
(62.27)
NPLtoE 443.4*** 403.4*** 715.5***
(134.7) (117.5) (169.7)
NPLtoTLO -15.81***
(5.182)
TLOtoTCAP -40.67 -159.9*** -175.5***
(23.60) (26.62) (34.84)
INTCOV 58.73***
(15.43)
2008 146.0*** 5.660 21.09 -17.50
(14.47) (77.95) (77.89) (77.95)
2009 363.9*** 207.3*** 95.54 82.19 -49.76***
(35.24) (66.52) (109.0) (108.4) (9.356)
2010 181.0*** -40.39 -150.2 -141.8 -150.7***
(29.69) (109.4) (101.1) (116.4) (11.50)
2011 519.5*** 223.4 121.3 173.6 -24.38**
(88.54) (166.7) (171.6) (142.3) (9.383)
2012 736.9*** 287.0** 226.9** 277.7** -68.86***
(107.9) (114.9) (100.9) (112.6) (11.35)
2013 358.2*** 126.6 58.42 49.67 -125.5***
(44.28) (100.6) (82.63) (90.65) (10.79)
2014 176.6*** -109.9 -176.1** -152.1** -122.7***
(22.19) (87.27) (67.10) (64.92) (14.55)
2015 206.5*** -206.5* -310.7*** -317.8*** -70.73***
(32.14) (110.0) (89.51) (81.71) (15.15)
2016 260.8*** -192.1* -242.7** -293.8*** -77.80***
(31.50) (102.8) (87.37) (79.46) (17.09)
Constant 105.3*** 448.8*** 491.1*** 517.8*** 89.32***
(28.16) (72.28) (59.31) (65.12) (6.344)
N 265 64 64 63 144
R2 0.366 0.340 0.201 0.165 0.665
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ing and market influence, in brief: sufficient transparency
and disclosure, no guarantees for bail-out and efficient capi-
tal markets. I gave an overview over the conditions for sub-
sequent market influence, namely credible action (indirect
influence), sizeable cost effects (direct influence) and ade-
quate incentive structures. My literature review points out
that spreads of subordinated bonds can possibly reflect the
risk profile of banks and be implemented on a mandatory
level along current regulation.
Complementing the current literature on the monitoring
phase of market discipline, my empirical results contribute
to the discussion about the sensitivity of subordinated debt
instruments to bank risk. The main conclusions emerging
from my own empirical work are as follows: Firstly, subordi-
nated debt exhibits a significantly higher spread level of 50
to 120 BPS in contrast to senior debt and is potentially an
adequate instrument for MD. Secondly, rating agencies play
a vital role in providing information to subordinated debt
investors in primary markets and there exists a highly sen-
sitive relationship between an instrument’s rating class and
its spread level, ranging from 60 to 80 BPS per rating class
(for ratings up to class 6 on a scale from 1 to 10). Thirdly,
market participants are well-aware of different risk profiles
across banks and price this difference on primary and sec-
ondary debt markets for subordinated bonds. Many account-
ing variables are found to be with significant influence and
high magnitude to the spread level or the change in spread
level. Spreads are significantly sensitive to ROA, equity to
capital, loan loss reserves, provision for loan losses and non-
performing loans; each to notably more than 100 BPS per
standard error of change in the explanatory variable.
These insights have important implications regarding the
future use of subordinated debt as a regulatory measure in
Europe. Yield spreads might serve well as a market based
risk indicator, supplementing book ratios and ratings, and
could influence banks’ risk decisions directly and indirectly.
Given the positive findings on the monitoring phase of sub-
ordinated debt, most of the recent literature points towards
the common sense that regulators should perceive the poten-
tial of subordinated debt and actively incorporate it into their
framework.
The European market for subordinated debt is already
sizeable with total issuances of EUR 326bn, USD 204bn and
GBP 45bn in the years from 2007 to 2016. Although declin-
ing lately, it could be growing substantially if mandatory pro-
posals are implemented by regulators. Such mandatory sub-
ordinated debt proposals are widely discussed in research,
without coming to implementation in national or suprana-
tional frameworks yet. Future role of market discipline by
subordinated debt will be determined by viable approaches
and subject to regulators’ decisions. From a European, but
also from a global perspective, a common framework seems
unavoidable and common standards indicating the payment
rank would be desired to raise transparency.
Open questions emerging from my thesis provide avenue
for further research. It would be crucial to reassess whether
there is an optimal (minimum) level for shares of subordi-
nated debt. Future research might then wish to explain how
the feedback of spreads influences bank managers and risk-
taking exactly in extended moral hazard models. We still do
not fully understand how banks incorporate higher spreads
on subordinated debt markets into their behavior and how
TBTF guarantees interfere with a reaction. Therefore, the
role of implicit TBTF guarantees (or ‘no bail-out’ clauses vice
versa) should be further discussed in their effect on subor-
dinated debt spreads. This becomes especially crucial in the
European Banking Union when member countries are devi-
ating from commitments.
Concluding, I can say that the question motivating this
thesis was convincingly answered with sufficient evidence
for market discipline regarding the monitoring phase. Future
regulation on bail-in capital in Europe should seek to adopt
subordinated debt into their framework.
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